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JUST THE FACTS, MA’AM – A REVIEW OF THE PRACTICE OF 
THE VERBATIM ADOPTION OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A limited number of minor ambiguities or defects in the Federal rules have 
been developed, but the courts have proved themselves skillful in ironing out 
such difficulties, and some of the points have been or soon may be adequately 
dealt with by judicial construction and thus disappear.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is common, recognized practice for district courts to adopt verbatim the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that the prevailing party puts forward in 
its memorandum of law.2  Generally, this practice involves the district court 
requesting counsel to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law before or 
after the trial.3  This spares the court the sometimes difficult and time-
consuming process of writing its own explanation of the facts and how the law 
applies to them.  While this practice allows courts to operate more efficiently, 
the procedure the court adopts in requesting and reviewing a submission, or 
 
 1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Advisory Committee’s Report, 1 F.R.D. 79, 80 (1940). 
 2. See, e.g., In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005, 1008 (1st Cir. 1970) (“The practice of 
inviting counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is well established as 
a valuable aid to decision making.”); Howard v. Howard, 34 P. 1114, 1117 (Kan. 1893) (“It is not 
an uncommon practice for the attorneys of the respective parties to formulate such findings as 
they desire to have made, leaving the court to adopt them, or such of them as in its judgment have 
been established by the proofs.”).  See also Hon. Gunnar H. Nordbye, Improvements in Statement 
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1 F.R.D. 25, 30 (1940) (relaying his experience as a 
judge asking counsel for help in framing the findings of fact); 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  § 2578 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998). 
 3. See Hill & Range Songs, Inc. v. Fred Rose Music, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Tenn. 
1976). 
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submissions, may cause losing parties to feel as though their position has not 
been thoroughly considered.4  This results in appeals.5  In the past, when 
presented with findings of fact or conclusions of law drawn verbatim from one 
of the party’s memorandums of law, the courts of appeals struggled with the 
decision whether to apply the clearly erroneous standard mandated by FRCP 
526 or review the facts with heightened scrutiny.7  Analyzing the trial court’s 
findings with heightened scrutiny not only expends additional court resources, 
but it also inevitably undermines the respect appellate courts are to give to the 
findings of the trial court.  The Supreme Court settled the standard of review in 
the 1980s, but recently courts seem to have reverted back to a heightened 
standard.  This change is based on the procedure at the lower court.  Despite 
the precedent set by the Supreme Court and despite the Federal Rules 
Committee’s best effort to draft a clear rule, courts remain unsettled regarding 
the specific procedure to apply when adopting findings and conclusions 
verbatim, and the proper standard of review on appeal. 
Based on Rule 52, a court is required to set forth the findings of fact 
separately from the conclusions of law.8  Findings of fact are defined as 
“[d]eterminations from the evidence of a case . . . concerning facts averred by 
one party and denied by the another.”9  Conclusions of law are defined as 
 
 4. See Las Colinas, 426 F.2d at 1008. 
 5. Under Rule 52, as opposed to state law, where parties must request specific findings of 
fact, parties in federal court need not request findings because the district court is required to find 
the facts specially.  On appeal, parties have the option to raise the issue of the judge’s adoption of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Appellants preserve this issue under Rule 52(b), which 
states: 
On a party’s motion filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the court may 
amend its findings – or make additional findings – and may amend the judgment 
accordingly.  The motion may accompany a motion for a new trial under Rule 59.  When 
findings of fact are made in actions tried without a jury, the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the findings may be later questioned whether or not in the district court the 
party raising the question objected to the findings, moved to amend them, or moved for 
partial findings [under Rule 52(c)]. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b).  See generally 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1999 (1995); 105 NY JUR. 2D Trial 
§ 583 (1992); 54 A.L.R. 3d § 868 (1974). 
 6. FED. R. CIV. P. 52.  Courts refer to the following text in Rule 52(a) when discussing 
verbatim adoption of findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
[T]he court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered . . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court judge to judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses.  The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
 7. See infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text. 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
 9. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 437 (6th ed. 1991). 
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“[s]tatement[s] of court[s] as to law applicable on basis of [the] facts.”10  One 
commentator noted that requiring trial courts to indicate their findings of fact 
serves three main purposes: (1) aid the appellate court in reviewing the case,11 
(2) narrow and clarify the issues for the proper application of estoppel and res 
judicata,12 and (3) ensure the trial judge carefully analyzed and reviewed the 
facts.13  Arguably, the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
indistinguishable.14  However, when a judge adopts these findings and 
conclusions verbatim, their significance becomes more apparent. 
This article analyzes the practice of the verbatim adoption of findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, focusing on federal district courts.  Part II outlines 
the evolution of the practice through the history of Rule 52 and through the 
judiciary’s response to district courts who adopt findings of fact and 
conclusions of law verbatim.  Part III discusses circumstances in which it may, 
or may not, be appropriate to adopt findings and conclusions verbatim.  Part IV 
analyzes the various procedures district courts apply when adopting findings 
and conclusions, and whether appellate courts consistently apply the clearly 
erroneous standard.  Part V outlines the various ethical and professional 
obligations of judges and attorneys.  The article concludes that the practice of 
adopting findings and conclusions verbatim will continue to evolve and endure 
in the courts.  However, the history of the practice balanced with the duties of 
attorneys and the judiciary provides sufficient checks against abuse of the 
practice. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ACCEPTED PRACTICE 
A. History of Rule 52 
Enacting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was a milestone in the 
evolution of the American judicial system, particularly in light of the 
significance of findings of fact and the standard of review on appeal.  The 
purpose of the rules was to adopt a uniform system for all federal cases, 
thereby abolishing the procedural distinction between equity cases and 
common law actions that had existed since 1789.15  Distinguishing between the 
 
 10. Id. at 200. 
 11. 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2571 n.8. 
 12. Id. § 2571 n.9. 
 13. Id. § 2571 n.10. 
 14. See Nevin Van de Streek, Why Not ‘Findings of Law’ and ‘Conclusions of Fact’ and 
Opinions About Both?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 109 (1994) (suggesting that there is not really a 
difference between findings and conclusions). 
 15. See generally Hon. W. Calvin Chestnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 533, 540 (1936) (analyzing the proposed federal rules) (“[T]he new 
rules as a whole professedly abolish the distinction between law and equity saving only the 
preservation of jury trial as required by the 7th Amendment.”); Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F. 
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two systems on appeal, one commentator noted that equity review on appeal 
consisted of a re-examination of the entire record of both the facts and the law, 
where Rule 70½ would apply.16  Alternatively, an appeal at law was limited to 
a review of the alleged errors made by the trial court.17  Also at law, before the 
trial, a party could waive a jury trial so that a judge, instead of a jury, would 
determine the facts of the case.18 
While most welcomed a uniform procedural system, the rule that is now 
Rule 52, was first Rule 68,19 and various commentators raised issues 
surrounding the appropriate weight of the findings in light of the judge’s role 
as well as the potential for an increased number of appeals.20  Specifically, the 
main issues consisted of (1) the threat of less weight being given to the 
findings compared to verdicts, (2) the significance of the trial judge’s ability to 
 
Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190-91 (1937) (discussing the issues 
surrounding the adoption of rules uniting actions at equity and law regarding findings of fact). 
 16. Clark & Stone, supra note 15, at 190.  For a more historical account of the Federal Rules 
of Equity, see Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary 
Evidence or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506 (1963) [hereinafter Note] (summarizing 
the evolution of Rule 52).  Equity Rule 70½ stated in part: 
In deciding suits in equity, including those required to be heard before three judges, the 
court of first instance shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon; and, in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions, the court of first 
instance shall similarly set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. 
9 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 52App.01 (3d ed. 1999). 
 17. Clark & Stone, supra note 15, at 190. 
 18. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 500, 501 (repealed 1948).  The statute allowed 
parties to waive a jury trial, stating in part: 
[I]ssues of fact in civil cases in any circuit court of the United States may be tried and 
determined by the court without the intervention of a jury, whenever the parties, or their 
attorneys of record, file a stipulation in writing with the clerk of the court waiving a jury.  
The finding of the court upon the facts, which finding may be either general or special, 
shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury. 
Id.  See also Edson R. Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Cases Where 
Juries are Waived, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 218 (1937) (reviewing the formalities of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in common law actions). 
 19. Rule 68 stated in part: 
In all actions tried without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately the conclusions of law thereon; and in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions, the court shall similarly set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action.  The findings of the court in such cases shall 
have the same effect as that heretofore given to findings in suits in equity. 
See William W. Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 68, 
70-71 (1936) (citing Rule 68). 
 20. Compare Chestnut, supra note 15, at 540-41, with Blume, supra note 19, at 71-73 
(supporting Rule 68 in light of Judge Chestnut’s criticism), and Clark, Letter to the Editor, 
Review of Facts Under Proposed Federal Rules, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 129 (1936) 
(responding to Prof. Blume’s article). 
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see and hear the witnesses as opposed to the “cold printed record,”21 and (3) 
the compelling interest of reducing the number of appeals.22 
To address one of these major issues, in an amendment in 1946, the 
committee drafting the Rules of Federal Procedure tried to resolve confusion 
regarding the use of findings of fact in court memoranda or opinions.23  
According to the Committee, the amendment would “remove any doubt that 
findings and conclusions are unnecessary upon decision of a motion.”24  Courts 
tried to conform to this standard, adapting its findings of fact to be a “fair 
presentation” for the appellate court.25  The findings and conclusions only 
needed to include the most relevant details relating to issues in the case.26  
Courts were careful not to set a standard so high that it would “impose onerous 
labors on a district judge,”27 and maintained their support for counsel’s “aid” to 
the trial judge in drafting or correcting the findings of fact or conclusions of 
law.28  In its attempt to create a uniform standard, however, the Committee 
drafted a rule allowing such a high degree of subjectivity that courts 
interpreted Rule 52(a) inconsistently.29  This confusion resulted in various 
procedures of adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim, 
folllowed by appellate courts establishing a standard of review higher than the 
clearly erroneous standard.30 
 
 21. Chestnut, supra note 15, at 540. 
 22. See generally Blume, supra note 19, at 71-73 (arguing points presented by Judge 
Chestnut). 
 23. See 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 52App.02.  The committee added two sentences: 
If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law appear therein.  Findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as 
provided by Rule 41(b). 
Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Matton Oil Transfer Corp. v. The Dynamic, 123 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1941). 
 26. See United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-43 (2d Cir. 1942). 
 27. Matton, 123 F.2d at 1001. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 113-16 (9th Cir. 1962); Terri Y. Lea, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a): Applicability of the “Clearly Erroneous” Test to Findings 
of Fact in All Nonjury Cases, 29 HOW. L.J. 639 (1986); Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 50(a): 
Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 
655 (1988) (“The courts apply the clear error standard to such cases, at times even when there is 
telling circumstantial evidence that the district judge has not undertaken the responsibility of 
independent decision.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 752-53 (3d Cir. 1965). 
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B. The Road to the Supreme Court 
It is not surprising that district courts have interpreted Rule 52 
inconsistently.  There are numerous ways in which a court may request 
findings and conclusions from parties and review those submissions.  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has addressed the practice of adopting 
findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim in only a few cases, and in 
those cases, the Court narrowly tailored its opinion to the facts of the case.31  
These opinions do not embrace a specific procedure; the Court merely reviews 
the lower court’s procedure in requesting the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.  Generally, an upper-level court focuses on the district court’s duty to 
demonstrate independent thought and analysis in its opinion, which is the same 
guideline adopted by state courts.32 
1.  The Significance of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Before the issue of the verbatim adoption of findings and conclusions even 
arose, the Supreme Court recognized the need for a court to draft findings of 
fact independent of the final opinion in Interstate Circuit, a case on direct 
appeal.33  In Interstate Circuit the trial court did not write formal findings, 
contrary to the requirement under Rule 70½.34  The Supreme Court stated that 
a district court’s opinion would not constitute an adequate substitute for 
findings of fact.35  Emphasizing the significance of findings in a bench-tried 
case, the Supreme Court noted that for a district court to satisfy its duty, it 
should dispose of all the issues in the case “appropriately and specifically” in 
special and formal findings of fact.36  The later adoption of Rule 52 eliminated 
any confusion created by Rule 70½ by explicitly requiring that a court must 
find and state the facts at issue.37 
While the Court thus made clear the duty to state findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, courts were left to determine the extent to which they 
could adopt findings of fact and conclusions of law into an opinion.  Only a 
few years after Interstate Circuit, the Second Circuit confronted a case in 
which it was apparent that the lower court had “mechanically adopted” the 
 
 31. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 32. See, e.g., State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 281-85 (Mo. 1997) (Stith, J., dissenting); 
Mullenix-St. Charles Properties, L.P. v. City of St. Charles, 983 S.W.2d 550, 555-56 (Mo. App. 
1998); Outdoor Advertising Ass’n of Ga. v. Dep’t of Transp., 367 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1988). 
 33. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 304 U.S. 55 (1938). 
 34. Id. at 56. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 55-56. 
 37. See Nordbye, supra note 2, at 28-29 (discussing the significance of findings of fact under 
Rule 52 in contrast to Rule 70½). 
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proposed findings of fact into the opinion.38  The district court’s opinion in 
Forness included the objections to the defendant’s proposed findings, and upon 
further investigation, the Second Circuit determined that some of these 
findings were neither supported by the evidence39 nor substantially consistent 
with the court’s opinion.40  The “mechanically adopted” term became the 
standard used by courts to analyze the extent to which the lower court analyzed 
the facts and wrote the opinion using independent thought.41  This threshold 
acknowledged the court’s enduring and significant role of fact-finding.42  
Judge Frank stated, “The correct finding . . . of the facts of a law suit is fully as 
important as the application of the correct legal rules to the facts as found.”43 
2. Standard of Review 
While both courts and commentators recognized the significance of 
findings, the issue of the appropriate standard of review remained 
unresolved.44  However, in Gypsum, the Supreme Court reviewed the findings 
in detail, and applied the clearly erroneous standard of review outlined in the 
newly adopted Rule 52.45  This standard encompassed the same premise 
underlying the practice in equity: the district court’s findings, while not 
determinative, should carry great weight with the appellate court since it has 
observed witness testimony firsthand.46  The Court further defined the clearly 
erroneous standard with respect to findings, stating: “A finding is ‘clearly 
erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
 
 38. Forness, 125 F.2d at 930, 942. 
 39. Id. at 656.  See also United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185 (1944) 
(“[The findings] must stand or fall depending on whether they are supported by evidence.”). 
 40. Forness, 125 F.2d at 942. (“Such a result can usually be avoided by . . . filing findings 
with the opinion.”). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); McDowell v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 753 F.2d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 1985) (selecting certain submitted findings and 
independently writing some findings was sufficient to show there was not a “mechanical” 
adoption of the findings of fact); Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard Oil & Serv. Co., 760 F.2d 417, 421-
22 (2d Cir. 1985) (deleting argumentative language and including independent findings were 
sufficient to show there was not a “mechanical” adoption of the findings and conclusions). 
 42. See Forness, 125 F.2d at 942.  See generally infra Part V.A. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally Solomon Oliver, Jr., Appellate Fact Review Under Rule 52(a): An Analysis 
and Critique of Sixth Circuit Precedent, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 667, 674 (1985) (analyzing the 
appropriate standard of review with respect to the type of evidence presented and to findings 
applying the law to the facts). 
 45. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 46. Id.  See also Clark & Stone, supra note 15, at 207-08; Note, supra note 16, at 514-15 
n.51. 
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on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.”47 
Despite the Court’s clear precedent in Gypsum, appellate courts remained 
skeptical when a lower court adopted findings and conclusions verbatim.  To 
address this concern, the Third Circuit established a higher standard of review 
than the clearly erroneous standard for findings of fact prepared ex post facto.48 
The Fourth Circuit also adopted this standard.49  For example, in Roberts v. 
Ross, the trial court concluded that the parties had not made a promise in an 
oral contract dispute regarding a commission, and found for Ross.50  First, the 
trial court announced its decision for Ross as a general verdict, and did not 
write any facts or conclusions of law.51  Then, the judge directed Ross’ counsel 
to write the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and form of judgment.52  The 
district court adopted those findings and conclusions verbatim.53  On appeal, 
Judge Maris criticized the procedure the trial court had applied, stating the 
procedure “flies in the face of the spirit and purpose, if not the letter, of Rule 
52(a),” and consequently, the court had “no indication of the legal standard 
under which the evidence was considered.” 54 
According to Judge Maris, the trial court’s duty is to “formulate and 
articulate” the facts, accomplishing two main purposes: (1) enable the parties 
to better understand the court’s reasoning and analysis and (2) assist the 
 
 47. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395, 396 (“Where such testimony is in conflict with 
contemporaneous documents we can give it little weight, particularly when the crucial issues 
involve mixed questions of law and fact.”).  At that time, therefore, the Supreme Court was 
“unclear” regarding whether the clearly erroneous standard applied to all categories of fact 
evidence.  Oliver, supra note 44, at 674. 
 48. See Roberts, 344 F.2d at 751-52; William A. Kaplin, Federal Procedure: Fed. R. Civ. P. 
52(a): The Role of Counsel in Preparation of Special Findings of Fact: Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 
747 (3d Cir. 1965), 51 CORNELL L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1966). 
 49. See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983); Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v. 
Kendall Co., 288 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1961). 
 50. Roberts, 344 F.2d at 751. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  The appellate court did not state whether the losing party either submitted any 
findings or conclusions, or whether they were given an opportunity to respond to the prevailing 
party’s findings and conclusions.  The lower court opinion is not published. 
 53. Id. at 748. 
 54. Id. at 751.  Judge Maris stated: 
The purpose of [Rule 52] is to require the trial judge to formulate and articulate his 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the course of his consideration and 
determination of the case and as a part of his decision making process, so that he himself 
may be satisfied that he has dealt fully and properly with all the issues in the case before 
he decides it and so that the parties involved and this court on appeal may be fully 
informed as to the basis of his decision when it is made. 
Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] JUST THE FACTS, MA’AM 205 
appellate court in reviewing the case.55  When a trial court decides the outcome 
of a case and then later adopts one party’s findings verbatim, the appellate 
court lacks a sufficient foundation for knowing that the adopted findings were 
in fact the basis of the court’s decision.56  To discourage this practice, the 
Third Circuit held that unless the trial court could prove it had studied the facts 
or had written the findings, the appellate court would adopt a more stringent 
standard of review.57  Under this higher standard of review, the appellate court 
would analyze the findings and conclusions “more narrowly” and given them 
“less weight.”58 
Twenty years later, in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the 
Supreme Court supported the circuits’ condemnation of trial courts that 
“mechanically” adopt findings of fact and conclusions of law and cautioned 
appellate judges to uphold their duty to review.59  In El Paso, after the trial, the 
district court judge announced he was going to dismiss the case, would not 
write an opinion, and instructed the prevailing party, El Paso Natural Gas Co., 
to write the findings of fact.60  Counsel submitted 130 findings of fact and one 
conclusion of law, all of which the court adopted verbatim.61  The Supreme 
Court rejected the district court’s “mechanical adoption” of the findings of fact 
and implied the lower court had failed to satisfy its primary duty to prepare 
findings.62  According to Justice Douglas, the judge must prove the findings 
were “the product of the workings of his mind.”63  Despite its disapproval, the 
Supreme Court did not reject the lower court’s findings because the evidence 
supported them.64  Furthermore, the Court left the issue of the appropriate 
standard of review for another day.  Justice Douglas did not announce the 
 
 55. Roberts, 344 F.2d at 751. 
 56. Id. at 751-52. 
 57. Id. at 752 n.5 (citing Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 259 F.2d 398, 
400-01 (5th Cir. 1958)); Mesle v. Kea Steamship Corp., 260 F.2d 747, 750 (3d Cir. 1958) 
(analyzing the facts and conclusions narrowly). 
 58. Roberts, 344 F.2d at 752. 
 59. 376 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1964).  The United States charged El Paso Natural Gas Co. with a 
violation of the Clayton Act after the company acquired the assets of a pipeline company, 
claiming the acquisition reduced the level of competition in California’s natural gas market. Id. at 
652. 
 60. El Paso, 379 U.S. at 656. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 657 n.4 (referring to Judge J. Skelly Wright, who warned judges not to sign “what 
some lawyer puts under your nose,” since the findings may be tainted with a zealous lawyer’s 
version of the facts.  He stated, “When these findings get to the courts of appeals they won’t be 
worth the paper they are written on as far as assisting the court of appeals in determining why the 
judge decided the case.”). 
 63. Id. at 656. 
 64. Id. at 657. 
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clearly erroneous standard per se, but he did acknowledge the Court’s reliance 
on Rule 52 in reaching its decision.65 
A decade later, the Supreme Court again had an occasion to criticize a 
district court that adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim.66  
In another case on direct appeal, the lower court had failed to include citations 
to the transcripts, making review more difficult.67  The Court strongly 
recommended that district courts assist appellate courts by entering an opinion 
“analyzing the relevant precedents in light of the record” so that it would not 
be “deprived of this helpful guidance.”68  Again, despite its criticism, the 
Supreme Court did not analyze the facts with greater scrutiny; instead, it 
applied the clearly erroneous standard pursuant to Rule 52.69 
3. The Supreme Court Speaks 
Even though the Supreme Court had repeatedly expressed its disapproval 
of courts adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim, it did not 
definitively announce the appropriate standard of review until Anderson v. City 
of Bessemer City.70  By the adopting the clearly erroneous standard as the sole 
basis for review, the Supreme Court rejected the heightened standard of review 
that various circuits, such as the Third and Fourth Circuits, had consistently 
applied.71  In Anderson, Phyllis Anderson, represented by the EEOC, sued 
Bessemer City, North Carolina in a sexual discrimination suit after the city 
hired a male to be recreation director.72  The district court decided in favor of 
Anderson, and then asked her counsel to submit detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, allowing the city to submit objections to the findings.73  
Ultimately, the trial judge issued its own findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, by adopting the “substance” of the submitted findings of fact, with some 
editing and additions.74  The Fourth Circuit strongly disapproved of this 
practice and determined that the trial court erred in requesting the findings of 
fact ex post facto and in adopting the “substance” of the prevailing party’s 
 
 65. El Paso, 379 U.S. at 657 n.4. 
 66. United States v. Marine Bancorporation Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 615 n.13 (1974) (citing El 
Paso, 376 U.S. at 656-57). 
 67. Id.  The findings of fact did not include cites to the transcript. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. 
 71. See, e.g., Roberts, 344 F.2d at 752 (establishing a higher standard of review for findings 
of fact and conclusions of law adopted verbatim). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 572-73; see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 717 F.2d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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findings.75  Following precedent, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the facts with 
heightened scrutiny.76 
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating that the determining 
factor was whether the judge “uncritically accepted” the findings submitted by 
the prevailing party.77  In Anderson, this did not appear to be the situation.  
First, the Court reasoned that the lower court had presented a general 
framework and had requested Anderson to provide more detailed findings.78  
Also, the city had sufficient opportunity to respond to the proposed findings.79  
Finally, the trial court had “considerably” modified the original findings of fact 
in both organization and content.80  Considering these factors, the Supreme 
Court did not undergo the same heightened standard of review that had been 
applied by circuits that condemned the practice.  Instead, the Supreme Court 
deferred to the clearly erroneous standard under Rule 52(a).81 
The Court acknowledged the meaning of clearly erroneous is “not 
immediately apparent,” but citing the clearly erroneous standard and the 
language in Gypsum,82 the Court would not overturn the findings unless there 
was evidence that a mistake had been committed.83  Moreover, based on the 
history of Rule 52, the Court stated that the duties of an appellate judge do not 
include a de novo review of factual issues.84  The court maintained that the 
determination of whether a mistake has been made does not allow an appellate 
judge to reverse a decision because he or she would have decided the case 
differently.85  Instead, the appellate court must defer to the trial judge’s 
findings of fact.86 
 
 75. Anderson, 717 F.2d at 156. 
 76. Id.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 77. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 572-73. 
 81. Id. at 573.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
 83. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573; see also Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395. 
 84. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395 
U.S. 100, 123 (1969)).  Compare Hon. John F. Nangle, The Even Widening Scope of Fact Review 
in Federal Appellate Courts – Is the “Clearly Erroneous Rule” Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 409 (1981) (warning readers of the expansion of the appellate courts who review the facts), 
with Hon. John C. Goldbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts – An Available and Appropriate 
Power, 12 CUMB. L. REV. 365, 366 (1982) (supporting the appellate courts’ review of the facts). 
 85. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. 
 86. Id. at 575.  Rule 52 requires the appellate court to defer to the trial judge’s findings of 
fact especially if they are based on “determinations of credibility,” as opposed to findings based 
strictly on documentary evidence.  In so deciding, the Supreme Court codified the language in 
Rule 52(a) stating, “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . .”  STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 778 (4th ed. 
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The Court thus concluded the Fourth Circuit interpreted the evidence and 
ruled according to the decision it would have made at the trial court level, 
which amounted to a de novo review of the findings.87  This violated the 
appellate court’s obligation to defer to the trial court’s findings of fact.88  
Therefore, the clearly erroneous standard applied only to the trial court’s 
findings, and the Court’s review of those findings did not indicate that they 
were clearly erroneous.89 
III. KNOWING WHEN TO SAY WHEN: CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY AND 
COMPLEXITY OF A CASE 
A. Intellectual Property: Patents 
In cases involving intellectual property, such as patents, commentators and 
courts seems less likely to criticize the verbatim adoption of findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.90  The inherently complex and sometimes confusing 
nature of patents makes the facts difficult to discern for judges who are not 
technically oriented.  Most circuits have explicitly recognized the distinction 
between “ordinary” cases and complex patent cases.  These circuits seem to 
 
1996).  See generally Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 
1985); 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 52App.06 and accompanying text. 
  In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Blackmun stated he might decide differently if 
the findings of fact were based on documentary evidence.  Anderson, 470 U.S. at 581.  See Lea, 
supra note 29, at 651-52. 
 87. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 576.  The district court read the evidence independently and then 
decided in favor of Phyllis Anderson based on her diverse qualifications, which fit the job 
description.  The appellate court, however, interpreted the job differently and concluded that 
another (male) applicant was better qualified. Id. at 576-77. 
 88. Id. at 577.  Justice White had already confirmed the credibility of the trial judge’s 
findings of fact.  See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 89. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577, 580-81.  Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, cautioned 
appellate courts not to apply the clearly erroneous standard in Rule 52(a) in a “conclusory 
fashion.”  He stated the majority’s discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s “meticulous” review of the 
record was not criticism of its “comprehensive review of the entire record of the case,” since 
some cases may require this kind of “burdensome” review.  Id. at 581. 
 90. See generally Bradley G. Lane, Note, A Proposal to View Patent Claim Nonobviousness 
from the Policy Perspective of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 20 U. MICH. J.L. REV. 
1157 (1987) (providing a detailed explanation of appellate review of patents); Maureen McGirr, 
Note, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit: Note, Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.: De Novo Review and the Federal Circuit’s 
Application of the Clearly Erroneous Standard, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 963 (1987) (discussing the 
Federal Circuit’s application of the clearly erroneous standard of review may overstep the 
boundaries of Rule 52(a)); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2591. 
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recommend courts should adopt the proposed findings verbatim if the court 
lacks the requisite knowledge to draft its own findings.91 
In addition to such substantive issues, the procedural posture in patent 
cases differs from other civil cases because patent disputes may originate at the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).92  If an applicant is 
dissatisfied with the decision made by the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (“BPAI”) at the USPTO, the applicant may appeal at the district 
court level or at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Court.93  In 
Gechter v. Davidson, the Federal Circuit held that the BPAI must write 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.94  Similar to district courts, 
predicted one commentator, administrative patent judges will soon require 
submission of findings and conclusions – on disks, making it easier for courts 
to revise and edit those submissions.95  If the case is appealed, the Federal 
Circuit will apply the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.96  As a result, 
similar to other civil cases, parties might request the appellate court to analyze 
 
 91. Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 616 F.2d 464, 468 n.6 
(10th Cir. 1980) (citing Photo Elecs. Corp. v. Ferrex Corp., 581 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(“Although the practice has been disapproved, we have indicated that it may be permissible in 
cases ‘involving highly technical issues such as may be involved in patent cases and complex 
scientific problems.’”) (citation omitted); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 506 F.2d 
960, 962 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[I]n areas of highly specialized litigation the typical judge is apt to be 
unfamiliar with the nomenclature common to the art or science involved.  In such cases he needs 
help in reducing his ultimate decision to accurate and understandable words.”); Louis Dreyfus & 
Cie. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 733, 738 (5th Cir. 1962) (stating the “indispensable” aid of 
counsel submitting findings in cases where the facts deal with patents); Las Colinas, 426 F.2d at 
1009 (citing Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp., 342 F.2d 531, 532 (1st Cir. 1965) (supporting the 
verbatim adoption of the findings and conclusions to avoid scientific error)). 
 92. Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  After review of the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, a party may appeal a decision to the United States 
Court of Appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 141.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.301 (1996), construed in Gechter, 
116 F.3d at 1457. 
 93. This circuit was created in 1982 and is assigned to hear patent cases.  See 35 U.S.C. § 
144 (1994) stating in part, “The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall 
review the decision form which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark 
Office.”  See also McGirr, supra note 90, at 964-65 n.8; notes 40-59 and accompanying text. 
 94. Gechter, 116 F.3d at 1460. 
 95. See Charles L. Ghols, The BPAI and the TTAB are Required to Set Forth Specific 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Adequate to Form a Basis for Appellate Review, 80 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5 (1998); see also Roger G. Strand, The Courtroom of the 
Future, 28 JUDGES J. 8 (1989) (suggesting that computer-integrated courtrooms should become 
more widespread to increase efficiency and production). 
 96. Gechter, 116 F.3d at 1457-58.  See also Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 
1112, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (supporting the clearly erroneous standard of review); Hybritech Inc. 
v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing the application 
of Rule 52 in the Federal Circuit in light of the Anderson decision).  See generally 119 F.R.D. 45, 
167 (1988); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2591; Lane, supra note 90, at 1164 n.38. 
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the facts and accord them less weight.97 The Federal Circuit stated that it will 
not apply this higher standard because “[i]t is acceptable for a trial court to 
adopt ‘many or most of the parties’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, particularly if skillfully and wisely drafted.”98 
B.  Civil Cases v. Criminal (Death Penalty) Cases 
Adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law outside the civil law 
context creates new issues since a court may be deciding the fate of a 
defendant, an especially solemn duty in death penalty cases.99  In Kenley, the 
Missouri Supreme Court concluded that in light of the common practice of 
adopting findings and conclusions, so long as the court “thoughtfully and 
carefully” considered the parties’ proposed findings, the lower court did not 
err.100  But the lone dissenter highlighted the “qualitative difference” between 
death and other forms of punishment, both in criminal and civil law the 
obvious difference being the finality of death.101  In light of these differences, 
the Florida Supreme Court stated: “The trial judge has the single most 
important responsibility in the death penalty process.  Under this process, a 
trial judge may not impose the death penalty unless he or she articulates in 
writing his or her factual findings and the reasons for imposing the death 
penalty.”102  Continuing her analysis in Kenley of the verbatim adoption in 
death penalty cases, Judge Stith also added that upper-level courts have a duty 
to review to the findings to “determine whether the judge below, the judge who 
actually heard the evidence, exercised his or her independent judgment in 
adopting the . . . findings.”103  Nevertheless, if the judge adopts the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law verbatim, the analysis on appeal will not change; 
the appellate judge must still determine whether the trial judge reviewed the 
facts independently.104 
 
 97. Roton, 79 F.3d at 1116. 
 98. Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 23 (7th Cir. 1992)). See 
generally McGirr, supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 99. See State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 282-83 (Mo. 1997) (Stith, J., dissenting).  The 
court had written its own findings and conclusions, but the assistant attorney general submitted a 
new set of findings and conclusions.  The trial judge adopted the submitted suggestions verbatim. 
Id. at 278-79. 
 100. See Kenley, 952 S.W.2d at 260-61 (“Those findings, though not the product of the 
workings of the district judge’s mind, are formally his; they are not to be rejected out-of-hand, 
and they will stand if supported by evidence.” (quoting El Paso, 376 U.S. at 656)). 
 101. Id. at 285 (citations omitted). 
 102. Corbett v. State, 602 So.2d 1240, 1243-44 (Fla. 1992). 
 103. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d at 283 (“I do not believe we can affirm simply by deciding that a 
reasonable judge could reach the findings and conclusions set out in the court’s judgment.”). 
 104. Id. at 281-85. 
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IV. DOUBLE TROUBLE: THE DISTRICT COURT’S PROCEDURE AND THE 
APPELLATE COURT’S STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. “Timing Is Everything” 
In Anderson, the Court seemed to rely on the procedure used by the district 
court as sufficient support to uphold the findings.105  In other cases, however, 
parties may not have had the opportunity to review and respond to the 
submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law.  In such cases parties have 
argued on appeal that their Due Process rights have been violated.106  This is 
particularly so when judges have requested findings and conclusions ex parte, 
and subsequently adopted those findings of fact and conclusions of law 
verbatim.107  Without explicit guidance regarding the procedural aspects of 
adopting findings and conclusions verbatim, courts remain confused as to 
whether this practice is acceptable in all cases, and on appeal, whether the 
clearly erroneous standard is the appropriate standard for review. 
Generally, a court will request findings either prior to the trial, before the 
case is submitted to the court, or after a full presentation of the evidence.108  
For example, one Tennessee district court explained that it would request each 
party’s counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
after the trial as though that party had prevailed.109  It will then use those 
findings and conclusions to write its memorandum opinion, “rarely . . . 
adopt[ing] proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law without making 
alterations, based on the court’s independent research and consideration.”110 
The Tennessee court also emphasized that occasionally cases will be of 
such length or complexity that it requires counsel to assist in preparing the 
opinion.111  If this occurs, the court explained that it would notify the parties in 
writing and include the notification in the court file.112  Again, this step in the 
court’s procedure indicates its attempt at being fair to both parties.  An extreme 
 
 105. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572 (concluding that the lower court’s procedure was fair because 
the losing party had the opportunity to respond to the submitted findings of fact). 
 106. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”).  See, e.g., Bilzerian v. Shinwa Co. Ltd., 184 B.R. 389, 392 
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (“Due process is denied a party when a judge adopts a party’s order verbatim, 
without previously conclusively ruling on the matters in it.”). 
 107. See also Mullenix-St. Charles Properties, L.P. v. City of St. Charles, 983 S.W.2d 550, 
555-56 (Mo. App. 1998). 
 108. See Kaplin, supra note 48, at 569. 
 109. See Hill & Range Songs, 413 F. Supp. at 969. 
 110. Id. (discussing its deviation from its normal procedure because the findings and 
conclusions had been extensively briefed).  See also Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 
326, 332 (4th Cir. 1983) (charging district courts to request findings and conclusions before 
reaching and announcing a decision to use the submissions to analyze the relevant issues). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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example of court adopting findings and conclusions without independent 
research and consideration is a court’s order that some appellate courts call a 
“ghostwritten” order.113  A Florida district court described a ghostwritten order 
as “an ex parte order which is not the product of personal analysis and 
determination by the judge, but the overreaching and exaggeration of the 
attorney who drafted it.”114  This inherent risk creates the need for an impartial 
court115 to analyze the findings of fact and conclusions of law under a process 
that is “fundamentally fair.”116 
Reviewing the district court’s process to determine whether it is 
“fundamentally fair” requires the cooperation of the court and counsel.  An 
appellate court will often analyze the orders or the opinion to determine 
whether the district court played an “active and inquiring role” in applying the 
submitted facts and conclusions.117  Therefore, the demonstration of 
independent review is essential.118  While the court retains the duty to review 
the submissions independently, counsel also has a duty to take advantage of 
any opportunity to be heard.  For example, in In re Dixie Broadcasting, the 
court directed the prevailing counsel to address specific points to reach a 
particular result when writing the court’s order.119  Instead of notifying the 
parties in writing, as the Tennessee district court described, the lower court 
announced its request in open court when all counsel were present.120  After 
 
 113. See Bilzerian, 184 B.R. at 392; In re Dixie Broad., Inc., 871 F.2d 1023, 1029 (11th Cir. 
1989); In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d  272, 274-76 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Thomas E. 
Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 913, 950 (1995) (rejecting the possibility that appellate courts could use the same 
“ghostwriting” procedures as district courts); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, 
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 273, 287 (1996) (discussing the recent, drastic changes in federal appellate 
courts). 
 114. Bilzerian, 184 B.R. at 392. 
 115. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) (1998) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States 
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”).  See also Aiken County v. BSP Division of Envirotech Corp., 866 F.2d 661, 679 
(4th Cir. 1989) (citing Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1978) (“The question is 
not whether the judge is impartial in fact.  It is simply whether another, not knowing whether or 
not the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question his [or her] impartiality on the basis 
of all the circumstances.”). 
 116. See Colony Square, 819 F.2d at 276-77. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 
228, 233 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The central issue is whether the district court has made an independent 
judgment.”). 
 119. See Dixie Broad., 871 F.2d at 1030. 
 120. Id. In other cases, the courts have outlined the general framework of the opinion for 
counsel. See, e.g., Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572. 
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the order was written, the losing party did not request to review the draft or to 
make objections to it, even though opportunity to do so existed.121 
Because there are numerous ways to achieve fairness to both parties, courts 
will not always scrutinize the lower court’s exact procedure.122  If the appellate 
court simply relies on the lower court’s integrity, appellants may feel as though 
they are left without any recourse.123  If, however, the court follows a general 
procedure that has been deemed to be “fundamentally fair,” then an appellant’s 
claim of a due process violation will fail and the lower court’s opinion, 
adopting the findings and conclusions verbatim, will be upheld.124 
B.  Stricter Standard of Review 
Since the decision in Anderson, the Supreme Court has continued to 
uphold the clearly erroneous standard in cases where a lower court has adopted 
findings and conclusions verbatim in its opinion.125  Unlike due process 
challenges where the appellate court usually analyzes the lower court’s 
procedure,126 in cases where parties challenge the clearly erroneous standard of 
 
 121. Dixie Broad., 871 F.2d at 1030.  See, e.g., Lilly, 720 F.2d at 330 (rejecting the claim that 
the trial court failed to perform its duty because the court had invited the losing party – twice – to 
either respond or submit its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and the losing party 
failed to do so). 
 122. See, e.g., Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. EPA, 81 F.3d 1371, 1386 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(“We tolerate the occasional use of this device because of our trust that district courts will closely 
examine the proposed findings and will carefully consider the objections and arguments of the 
opposing party.”) (emphasis added); Triad Elec. & Controls, Inc. v. Power Sys. Eng’g, Inc., 117 
F.2d 180, 187 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[B]ased on our review of the record, we are confident that the 
district court closely examined the proposals and likewise considered most carefully Triad’s 
position.”) (emphasis added). 
 123. See Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 313 (7th Cir. 1986): 
The wholesale adoption of a party’s proposed findings obscures the reasoning process of 
the judge.  It deprives this court of the findings that facilitate intelligent review.  It causes 
the losing litigants to conclude that they did not receive a fair shake from the court.  If a 
judge allows himself to act as a mouthpiece for the winning party, the loser may conclude 
that the judge was not impartial – that he was an advocate, using an advocate’s words, 
rather than a disinterested evaluator of the several advocates’ urgings.  This is an 
especially serious problem when the judge adopts language from a brief as opposed to 
selecting from among findings of fact that have been proposed by one side and subject to 
criticism by the other side. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 124. See Colony Square, 819 F.2d at 277. 
 125. See generally United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2038 n.10 (1998) (upholding 
the clearly erroneous standard regarding district court’s findings of fact); Anderson, 470 U.S. at 
564, 572; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-96 (1948).  See also 
MICHOL O’CONNOR, O’CONNOR’S FEDERAL RULES: CIVIL TRIALS 565 (1998). 
 126. See Marine Shale, 81 F.3d at 1386 (“While we discourage this practice [of adopting 
findings and conclusions verbatim], we have never radically altered the standard of review in 
such cases, much less concluded that such an adoption results in a per se due process violation.”). 
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review in Rule 52, the appellate court will examine the sufficiency of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.127  If a party can present evidence 
proving the trial court did not review and analyze the facts independently, 
some circuits, the Fifth Circuit in particular, may fall away from the court’s 
explicit application of the clearly erroneous standard and review the facts with 
greater scrutiny.128  For example, the Fifth Circuit stated that if a court 
mechanically adopts the findings, regardless of who prepared them, the court 
will “take into account the District Court’s lack of personal attention to factual 
findings in applying the clearly erroneous rule.”129  In these cases, however, it 
may be important to note that the precedent pre-dates the Anderson decision.130 
Conversely, in some cases, appellants distinguish the facts in their case 
from those in Anderson, attempting to prove the facts are “inadequate” to 
undergo judicial review.131  Having proven this, the appellant will then request 
that the court analyze the facts with greater scrutiny – despite the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Anderson.  When parties request this form of review, 
appellate courts look for evidence of independent thought, such as revisions to 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law.132  For example, if the trial judge 
made minimal revisions to the submitted facts, then an appellate court may 
analyze the facts with stricter scrutiny.133  In Andre v. Bendix Corp., both 
parties requested the court to give the findings a “more critical” reading on 
appeal because the district court adopted “substantial portions” of Andre’s 
 
 127. Andre v. Bendix Corp., 774 F.2d 793.  See generally 5A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 52.6 (Supp. 1997). 
 128. See Sierra Club, Lone Star Ch. v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 574 (5th Cir. 
1996) (citing FDIC v. Texarkana Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1989)); cf. SEC v. 
Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450, 1456 n.11 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to grant little deference to the 
findings since they were adopted verbatim); see generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 
22.52 (3d ed. 1995). 
 129. Texarkana Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d at 267 (citing Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 
615 F.2d 252, 258 (quoting Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1384 n.16 (5th Cir. 1979))). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Andre, 774 F.2d at 793-94 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573). 
 132. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1267 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Our review of the 
district court’s opinion remains deferential, but, in these circumstances, requires a closer and 
harder look.”).  Here, the district court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
without any changes whatsoever, including the adoption of typographical errors.  Id. 
 133. Id.  See also Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 574 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(citing Texarkana Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d at 267 (upholding the Fifth Circuit’s application of 
stricter scrutiny if the trial judge adopts the prevailing party’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law verbatim)).  Compare Alcock v. Small Bus. Admin., 50 F.3d 1456, 1459 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(applying the clearly erroneous standard but exercising greater scrutiny since the trial judge did 
not author the findings of fact in a bankruptcy case, where the court reviewed the facts de novo), 
with Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 567 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the clearly 
erroneous standard after due to the trial judge’s modifications to the findings of fact were 
evidence he did not uncritically accept the findings submitted by the prevailing party). 
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post-trial brief.134  This heightened review has not been universally accepted, 
however, and appellate courts are wary to review the facts with a standard 
different from the clearly erroneous standard.135  Because most circuits strictly 
adhere to the clearly erroneous standard, instead of analyzing the findings with 
greater caution, appellate courts may choose to reverse and remand the case.136 
2.   The Inevitable Return 
If the court declines to review the facts with greater scrutiny, the appellant 
may request the case be remanded for a new trial, after either vacating or 
reversing the decision.137  There are two main benefits to this option.138  
Remanding the case “ensure[s] proper consideration of the district court,” and 
it maintains the clearly erroneous standard without controversy.139  The Pentec 
court explained that the clearly erroneous standard has been “undermined sub 
silencio in some cases on appeal in an effort by the Courts of Appeal to 
 
 134. Andre, 774 F.2d at 793 n.6.  While the verbatim adoption of findings and conclusions is 
an accepted practice, the Second Circuit sharply criticized a trial court who partially adopted one 
of the party’s briefs verbatim, stating, “We have disapproved this practice because it disguises the 
judge’s reasons and portrays the court as an advocate’s tool, even when the judge adds some 
words of its own . . . . Unvarnished incorporation of a brief is a practice we hope to see no more.” 
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 626 (7th  Cir. 1990). 
 135. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1215-16 (3d Cir. 
1993) (denying the request to review the findings, which had been adopted verbatim, with greater 
scrutiny); Photo Elecs. v. Ferrex Corp., 581 F.2d 772, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1978) (reviewing the 
procedure used by the trial judge and the evidence to review the adopted findings and then 
applying the clearly erroneous standard of review); Edward Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works, 
289 F.2d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he same test is applied to the findings, whether the court 
prepared them or adopted those submitted by counsel.  The court’s adoption of appellee’s 
findings does not impeach or discredit them.  We accord them full weight.”); cf. Roberts, 344 
F.2d at 751-52. 
 136. See supra Part IV.A; see also Falcon Const. Co. v. Economy Forms Corp., 805 F.2d 
1229, 1232 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying a request to reverse in remand despite defects in the 
procedure used by the trial judge); In re X-Cel, Inc., 776 F.2d 130, 133-34 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(reversing and remanding the case because the facts were inadequate to undergo judicial review); 
Amstar Corp., 615 F.2d at 258 (citing Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 
501 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[W]e reverse when the result in a particular case does not reflect the truth 
and right of the case.”)).  See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 128, § 
22.52 n.454. 
 137. See Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls, Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 319 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(suggesting the appellate court reverse and remand to allow the district court to reconsider its 
original holding); see also Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974); State v. 
Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. 1997). Cf. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 288 F.2d at 724-25; Cuthbertson, 
702 F.2d at 465 (reversing and remanding as a policy of the Fourth Circuit if the trial judge 
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim).  See generally Oliver, supra note 
44, at 699-701 (proposing that appellate court treat the determination of all applications of law to 
fact as fact issues to unite both technical and non-technical legal standards). 
 138. Pentec, 776 F.2d at 319. 
 139. Id. 
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compensate for inadequate consideration by a District Court.”140  This 
alternative applies when there is absolutely no indication of the trial court’s 
independent review.141  For example, in a recent Third Circuit case, the 
remaining issue on appeal was the determination of attorneys’ fees.142  The 
district court announced its intent for the parties to write findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, whereupon the court would adopt one party’s findings of 
fact as its opinion “without modification.”143  In making this announcement, 
the court eliminated its duty to analyze the submissions from both parties and 
come to its own independent judgment.144  The Third Circuit rejected this 
procedure and remanded the case.145  In other cases, the court may reverse and 
remand when the losing party has not had the opportunity to respond to the 
other party’s findings of fact.146 
An example of the potential effect of this method is in the final outcome of 
Roberts v. Ross.147  After the Third Circuit vacated and remanded,148 the trial 
court reversed its prior decision without a hearing or a new trial.149  Where the 
court had previously determined the parties had not made a promise, on 
remand, the court concluded the parties had made a promise on several 
occasions.150 
In a recent Seventh Circuit case, the court criticized the lower court for 
adopting findings of fact so skewed that the opinion did not reflect the decision 
of a neutral judge.151  Each party had presented only the most drastic remedies 
to the court in their conclusions of law.152  When the trial judge adopted the 
findings verbatim, the losing party had to endure the most drastic remedy while 
the prevailing party “hit a home run.”153  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
supported the practice of adopting findings verbatim, but suggested that if the 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 232 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 143. Id.  Neither party objected to this practice, thereby making the “strategic decision” to 
waive their right to pursue this issue on appeal.  Id. at 236. 
 144. See generally id. at 233. 
 145. Id. at 233, 235. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Kaplin, supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 148. Roberts, 344 F.2d at 753. 
 149. Kaplin, supra note 48, at 567-68. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 23 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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parties submit findings that “hug the extremes,” the court should develop 
alternatives of its own.154 
V. ETHICS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A.   Judges 
In light of the Federal Rules, the district court has a duty to identify the 
facts that satisfy the standards of Rule 52.155 Judge Frank described this fact-
finding duty as an “art,” involving “skill and judgment,” because the correct 
facts will determine the outcome of a case.156  The wrong application of the 
law may be corrected on appeal, but wrong facts cannot be changed unless the 
appellant “overcomes the heavy burden of showing the facts are ‘clearly 
erroneous’.”157  The importance of the judge’s fact-finding role cannot be 
underestimated.  Because the trial judge is “absorbed in the law administration 
at first hand,” she holds “the most important office of government.”158 
Ultimately, a court has an overarching duty to review the facts and 
conclusions independently.  A court’s failure to satisfy this duty usually results 
in embarrassment in addition to wasted time and money.  An extreme example 
of this failure was the final outcome in Andre v. Bendix Corp., where an 
employee claimed she had been discharged based upon her gender.159  After 
both parties submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court 
adopted fifty-four out of the fifty-five pages of findings of fact from the 
prevailing party’s post-trial brief, including footnotes, citations, spelling, and 
typographical errors,160 essentially “photocopying” the brief.161  On appeal, the 
court looked for evidence of a “disinterested mind,” and included criticism of 
the trial court’s verbatim adoption of the findings of fact.162  Due to the court’s 
discretion, or lack thereof, the appellate court could not discern the lower 
 
 154. Id.  See also Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found., 152 F.3d at 239-40 (Garth, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for stifling “innovative and nontraditional approaches” in 
deciding cases in the district courts). 
 155. United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-43 n.42 (2d Cir. 1942). 
 156. Id. at 942-43. 
 157. Id. at 942. 
 158. Forness, 125 F.2d at 942 n.43 (citing Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence 
Cases, 28 COL. L. REV. 1014, 1037 (1948)). 
 159. Andre, 774 F.2d at 787. 
 160. Id. at 800. The court also noted that this wholesale adoption was even more harmful and 
“embarrassing” because the district court failed to adopt a page containing the numbered facts.  
Therefore, the court referred to numbered facts that did not exist in the final opinion. See id. 
(citing Andre v. Bendix, 584 F. Supp. 1485, 1505-07 (N.D. Ind. 1984)). 
 161. Andre, 774 F.2d at 791. 
 162. Id. at 800. 
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court’s reasoning, and thus vacated the prior judgment and remanded for a new 
trial, each party bearing its own costs.163 
The recognized source for guidance on ethical issues for the judiciary is 
the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.164  The canons in this code are 
the same as those in the Model Code of Conduct.165  The canons do not 
explicitly state specific or formal direction for judges adopting findings of fact 
and conclusions of law verbatim, but the Codes aid judges in their role as 
impartial administrators of the law.166  When a court adopts findings and 
conclusions verbatim without an independent review, the court abdicates its 
role.  Judicial opinions should reflect an unbiased review because, as one 
commentator noted, “it is important that the parties be shown that their case 
has been treated with intelligence and respect, [and] the way the opinion is 
written has large consequences for the future.”167  Therefore, while the practice 
of adopting findings and conclusions verbatim is not unethical per se, if a court 
relinquishes its role, then critical issues arise regarding the court’s failure to 
fulfill its duty. 
B. Lawyers 
Requiring a court to single-handedly write findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in all applicable cases is unrealistic.168  Simply stated, trial courts 
operate more efficiently by relying on counsel to assist in preparing the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.169  This honors the tradition of lawyers 
 
 163. Id. at 801. 
 164. OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GETTING 
STARTED AS A FED. JUDGE 59 (1997).  Materials regarding the judicial codes are also available in 
the Westlaw database under “CONDUCT.” 
 165. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1-5 (1990).  The Canons are the 
following: 
(1) A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. 
(2) A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the 
judge’s activities. 
(3) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently. 
(4) A judge shall so conduct the judge’s extra-judicial activities as to minimize the 
risk of conflict with judicial obligations. 
(5) A judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity. 
Id. 
 166. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, § 1.02 at 3-4 (stating that 
codes and rules are not used as an enforcement mechanism). 
 167. James Boyd White, What’s An Opinion For?, U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (1995). 
 168. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 166, § 6.01, at 167-68.  See also DAVID STEIN, JUDGING 
THE JUDGES: THE CAUSE, CONTROL, AND CURE OF JUDICIAL JUSTICE 110-13 (1974). 
 169. Dearborn Nat. Cas. Co. v. Consumers Petroleum Co., 164 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir. 1947), 
cited in Louis Dreyfus & Cie., 298 F.2d at 739 n.5.  Judge Minton stated: 
While the burden and responsibility to make findings of fact and state conclusions of law 
thereon are primarily upon the trial court, certainly counsel for the parties, especially the 
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assisting judges in “clerical” matters, such as writing the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.170  Justice Miller analogized the trial judge’s need for 
assistance from the lawyer to the appellate court’s need for the brief and oral 
arguments.171 
The duty to assist courts may, however, conflict with the attorney’s duty to 
be a zealous advocate for the client.172  The conflict is heightened when a judge 
adopts findings strictly verbatim.173  The findings, once signed, become the 
findings of the court.174  One judge noted, “[e]xperience shows that counsel, 
the most able, honorable, and conscientious . . . after the close of a hotly-
contested case, are not in the frame of mind, ordinarily best suited to drafting 
the findings, which must express the judgment of the court.”175  Due to the 
nature of this inherent conflict, there is an even greater duty on the trial court 
to review the findings and conclusions before adopting them verbatim. 
 
prevailing party, have an obligation to a busy court to assist is in the performance of its 
duty in this regard. 
Id. 
 170. English v. English, 35 P. 1107, 1108 (Kan. 1894) (“[W]e see no objection to allowing an 
attorney in the case to perform the clerical labor of writing up findings in accordance with the 
decision of the court as announced, leaving to the judge only the duty of examining, correcting, if 
necessary, and finally approving.”). 
 171. Schilling v. Schwitzer-Cummins Co., 142 F.2d 82, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1944).  While the 
courts may rely on attorneys to draft the findings and conclusions, what most judges do not 
mention in their opinions is the extensive use of law clerks to aid judges in their duties.  With 
respect to drafting the findings, according to Judge Morton, preparing a final draft is “largely 
ministerial, and certainly rises to no higher level than the service performed by a law clerk.” Hill 
& Range Songs, Inc. v. Fred Rose Music, Inc. 413 F. Supp. 967, 969 (M.D. Tenn. 1976).  See 
generally Mark W. Cannon & David M. O’Brien, Introduction to the Dynamics of the Judicial 
Process, in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 31 
(1985). Justice William H. Rehnquist stated: 
I think [people] would be shocked, and properly shocked to learn that an appellate judge 
simply ‘signed off’ on such a draft without fully understanding its import and in all 
probability making some changes in it.  The line between having law clerks help one with 
one’s work, and supervising subordinates in the performance of their work, may be a hazy 
one, but it is at the heart . . . [of] the fundamental concept of ‘judging’. 
Id. at 31 n.23. 
 172. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities 
(1998) (“As an advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the 
adversary system.”).  See id. at Rule 1.3; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 
7-101 (1983). 
 173. See Otero v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist., 470 F. Supp. 326, 328-29 (D. Colo. 1979) 
(“It is impossible for counsel in a case in which they are engaged to do anything impartially.”). 
 174. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 571-73 (1985). 
 175. Brenger v. Brenger, 125 N.W. 109 (1910), quoted in 1 F.R.D. at 85; In re Las Colinas, 
426 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
There are two major unresolved issues at the heart of the accepted practice 
of adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim.  First, there must 
be a “fundamentally fair” procedure.  At the time the rules were proposed, one 
commentator suggested that instead of requiring findings and conclusions in 
all cases, they should be required only in cases that would be appealed.176  As a 
condition of appeal, the appealing party would “submit a draft of the proposed 
findings to the trial judge with the option, if not the obligation, on the part of 
the appellee to submit alternative findings for the judge’s consideration.”177  
The present-day practice seems to reflect the commentator’s sentiments, but 
fails regarding the unconditional “obligation” to share the findings with the 
opposing party.  Were this obligation to exist and become part of the practice 
of adopting findings and conclusions verbatim, it would seem to reflect the 
ambiguous notion of a procedure that is “fundamentally fair.” 
Most circuits have outlined individual procedures for trial judges to 
follow.178  For a procedure to be deemed “fundamentally fair,” the court should 
request findings and conclusions from both parties, or at a minimum, allow the 
losing party to respond to the opposing party’s submitted facts and 
conclusions.  Moreover, once those findings and conclusions have been 
submitted and argued by both parties, the district court has a steadfast duty, 
mandated by Model Code of Judicial Conduct and by the Supreme Court, to 
review the facts independently.  This review will largely determine whether 
parties feel that the trial judge actually considered their arguments and 
issues.179 
The second major issue entails the proper standard of review on appeal.  
The Supreme Court’s review of the procedure and eventual application of the 
clearly erroneous standard seemed to resolve the issue.  However, appellate 
courts have still found occasions to review findings and conclusions adopted 
verbatim by the trial court with heightened scrutiny by relying on precedent 
existing before Anderson.  Alternatively, the courts might forego any analysis 
and remand the case.  Despite the Federal Rules Committee’s best efforts at 
drafting an unambiguous rule, the same issues that commentators emphasized 
at its adoption still remain.  The Supreme Court, meanwhile, has not “ironed 
out” the difficulties arising from the practice that grew out of Rule 52: the 
verbatim adoption of findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
In light of these issues and the fact that a court has the ultimate discretion, 
a final resolution of this issue probably does not exist.  There is nothing formal 
 
 176. Chestnut, supra note 15, at 572. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Roberts, 344 F.2d at 752-53; Lilly, 720 F.2d at 332; Professional Golfers Assoc. of 
Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 179. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 128,  § 22.52. 
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in Rule 52 addressing this issue, but there are certain prudential incentives that 
prevent courts from abusing the practice.  First, if serious attention was not 
given to the submitted findings and conclusions, then a court will lose the 
respect of the bar and the appellate court that oversees it.  Undoubtedly, no 
court wants to be in that position.  As with the law itself, we rely on the 
judiciary to carry out its duty to be impartial, which entails reviewing 
submitted findings and conclusions – in fairness to both parties.  Additionally, 
we rely on parties who feel as though they have been wronged to appeal.  On 
appeal, we trust that the judiciary will apply a standard of review, whether or 
not it applies a standard higher than the clearly erroneous standard in Rule 52, 
again – in fairness to both parties.   
KRISTEN FJELDSTAD 
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